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Abstract   A nested logit random utility travel cost model is developed for rec-
reational boating in southwest Florida. Using data from a survey of recreational
boaters, the model estimates site choice probabilities and compensating varia-
tion for changes in boating speed limits. Behavior is modeled as a two-step,
discrete-choice process, where boaters first select a launch point for their
trailered boats, then select a boating destination based on site characteristics.
The results of this particular model are currently being used in policy applica-
tions in Florida.
Key words   Boating valuation, nested logit, policy analysis, random utility
model, travel cost.
Introduction
To effectively manage environmental and natural resources, state and federal regula-
tory agencies must understand the costs and benefits of their rules and policies. To
answer this need, economists have developed a number of approaches, typically cat-
egorized as stated preference and revealed preference methods, to estimate the value
of access to natural resources. Stated preference models use survey-based methods
to directly elicit valuations from users of the resources. Revealed preference ap-
proaches rely instead on observed or reported behavior to infer value. Revealed
preference methods can also use surveys to collect information on costs incurred,
trip destinations, trip frequencies, and the like.
Regulations by the state of Florida creating speed zones for boats in areas where
manatees congregate provide an example of a regulatory action for which these
methods may be used to estimate costs or benefits. In 1978, Florida’s state legisla-
ture passed the Manatee Sanctuary Act to protect the endangered West Indian Mana-
tee in the state’s waters. Eleven years later, the governor and cabinet called for
implementation of the Act by creation of speed limits in 13 of the state’s coastal
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counties.1 Boating speed limits in these areas typically require boaters to travel at
very slow, or “no wake,” speeds.
Some recreational boaters and marine industry groups have criticized these speed
limits on the grounds that they bring about longer, more costly recreational boating trips.
Speed limits would, they say, preclude activities like water skiing, making recreational
boating a less enjoyable activity. These criticisms are sometimes accompanied by pre-
dictions of fewer trips and reduced demand for boats and for related services, such as
those provided by marinas. Marina owners, in particular, sometimes express concern
that the new speed zones will require lengthier, more time-consuming trips for recre-
ational boaters, reducing boat usage and demand for boats and marina space.2
Such concerns seem reasonable: if recreational boating becomes more costly or
time consuming, the quantity of boating trips demanded declines, and a consequent
decline in demand for associated services, such as those provided by marinas, is re-
alized. But these potential outcomes hinge upon the reactions of recreational boat-
ers, who along with the manatees, of course, are most likely to be directly affected
by the speed zones. This circumstance raises the question: How will recreational
boating behavior respond to the imposition of these zones?
One such case is the current rule proceeding for Lee County, Florida, where the
state’s Department of Environmental Protection proposed a manatee speed zone rule in
1994.3 Local and statewide boating and marina groups criticized the rule because they
felt it would impose substantial costs to their industries, as recreational boaters substi-
tute other marinas, or even other forms of recreation, in response to the new speed limits.
A regulatory agency may find it useful to estimate potential costs or benefits in
an attempt to better understand the economic implications of a proposed rule. One
approach would be to attempt a valuation of the expected benefits of manatee speed
zones. Presumably, manatees would face reduced risk of collision and injury or
death from boats. It is possible to estimate a dollar valuation of these benefits, per-
haps by conducting a stated preference analysis, which would show how people
value the reduction in risk to manatees.4
One might also assess the effects of disruptions in recreational boating activity
caused by the imposition of the speed zones. Boaters may incur costs by taking
slower, longer trips or by selecting a different set of departure points and destina-
tions. The purpose of this paper is to assess the response of recreational boaters to
the imposition of the speed zones in Lee County, Florida.
A nested logit random utility model (RUM) is employed to estimate compensat-
ing variation for redistribution of boating effort as a result of the rule.5 Reliable esti-
mates of compensating variation can provide regulatory agencies with more com-
plete information regarding the economic implications of their rules, and could be
used to help design more effective ones.
Random Utility/Nested Logit
The RUM is well suited to model demand for access to recreation sites, especially
when the user has several identifiable substitute sites from which to choose.
1 Brevard, Broward, Citrus, Collier, Dade, Duval, Indian River, Lee, Martin, Palm Beach, St. Lucie,
Sarasota, and Volusia counties.
2 Based on public comments from speed zone rule proceedings conducted by the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection.
3 As of the writing of this draft (August 2001) the Lee County rule proceeding had not yet been com-
pleted, and the rule had not yet been adopted.
4 See Bell and Bendle, 1995.
5 The rule proposes slow-speed areas in many heavily traveled areas in Lee County waters.A Random Utility Approach to Boating in Florida 25
Bockstael, McConnell, and Strand (1989); Milon (1988); Morey, Rowe, and Watson
(1993); and Greene, Moss, and Spreen (1997) have applied the RUM to sport or rec-
reational fishing. To the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to apply the RUM
to recreational boating. The theoretical details of the RUM have been discussed in
detail in the references noted above, and Morey (1997) also provides an excellent
discussion of the RUM’s theoretical underpinnings.
As is often the case with environmental and natural resources, there is no direct
charge to recreational boaters for access to Lee County’s waters. Boaters do, of
course, incur related costs, which can be substantial; i.e., the purchase of a boat, li-
censing and registration, operation and maintenance costs, the costs of mooring the
boat or of travel to the site, and the opportunity cost of time, to name the most obvi-
ous. In this paper, travel cost information collected from registered boaters in Lee
and neighboring Charlotte Counties is used to estimate demand for recreational
boating in Lee County. The RUM then estimates boaters’ probabilities of selecting
departure and destination points before and after the imposition of the speed zones.
Any change in departure or destination might then be used to make inferences re-
garding direction of boating effort away from the speed zones to unregulated areas.6
The RUM models the selection of a particular recreational site based on its dis-
tinguishing characteristics, so that the choice maximizes utility. The RUM estimates
probabilities of each boater going to each site, using information on site and demo-
graphic characteristics, travel cost, and opportunity cost of time. The model is typi-
cally expressed as:
U V TC X Z e ijk ijk ijk j k ijk =( , , ) +, (1)
where Uijk represents the utility realized by individual i selecting launch point j and
destination k; Vijk represents the characteristics and determinants of choice observable
and known to the analyst; TCi,j,k is the travel cost for person i to use boat launch j to visit
boating site k; Xj is a vector of launch point characteristics; Zk is a vector of boating
site characteristics; and eijk are factors known only to the boater making the trip.
The model estimates the probability that individual i will select launch point j

















In its multinomial logit form, the RUM models a decision sequence in which a
boater selects a launch point and then a destination site. A boater in Lee County will
have to decide whether the lower speed limits will disrupt his trip, and if so, whether
another unzoned destination should be chosen. Thus, an analysis would require an
estimated distribution of boating trips with and without the speed zones. Holding all
other variables constant, the inference can be made that any redistribution of trips
after the zones are in place must be attributable to the costs imposed by the presence
of the zones. These costs may be travel expenditures resulting from longer boating
distances or suboptimal boat operation due to lower speeds. They may also include
opportunity costs of time and expenditures associated with selecting, and then trav-
eling to, a different destination or launch point.
6 Lee County already has various rules and speed zones; in this paper “unregulated” means an area not
affected by the proposed rule.Thomas and Stratis 26
The Model
While the Florida manatee speed zone program addresses all forms of recreational
boating activity, modeling requires a more focused perspective. The model concen-
trates on recreational boating, as distinct from recreational fishing trips made by
boat, primarily because (in Lee County, anyway) fishing seems to be a similar, but
different, activity.7 Another aspect of the model’s focus is on departure points and
accessibility. The ease with which a boater can get to the boat and embark upon the
trip is a factor in selecting launch point and destination. Recreational boaters can be
categorized according to their residence and how they store their boats. The first
category of boating accessibility includes boaters who reside along navigable water-
ways and keep their boats at adjacent private docks. The second category is com-
prised of boaters who store their boats in either wet or dry storage at private marinas
with easy access to navigable waters. The last category of boaters, and numerically
the largest, store boats at home on trailers, permitting access to the many widely dis-
persed public and private ramps located throughout the two-county region. The fo-
cus of this effort is the last category. In a further refinement based upon boating be-
havior, only those who have an undetermined trip purpose or participated in activi-
ties such as water skiing, swimming, or sightseeing are modeled. Those who con-
sider fishing to be the principal purpose of their boating trip are not considered in
this model.
The model assumes that boaters start their recreational experience when they
leave the launch point in their boat. Unlike anglers, who would likely consider
travel from the launch point to the preferred fishing site as an expense, the recre-
ational boater is assumed to consider the entire boating trip a part of the purchased
recreational service. Additionally, unlike a participation model that assumes the first
choice is one of boating participation (Greene, Moss, and Spreen 1997; Morey,
Shaw, and Rowe 1991), the model assumes that individuals have already made the
participation decision and now face choices between potential substitute experiences
offered by different launch point/boating site combinations. Using a nested multino-
mial logit (MNL) format, the underlying decision tree assumes that participants
must first select the boat launch point, and then, based upon this launch point
choice, select a boating site destination. Although other nesting structures are pos-
sible, this approach provides a good fit for the data, and has reasonably intuitive ap-
peal in describing the decision process likely taken by boaters in choosing their
boating trip. The presence of abundant waterways and well-developed road systems
in the area lead to the assumption that every destination boating site is reachable
from every launch point, which, in turn, is accessible to every city of origin, result-
ing in a balanced nested decision structure.
To empirically test the model, primary data were collected by the Florida De-
partment of Environmental Protection (FDEP) in 1998 as part of a larger study to
determine boating behavior and expenditure patterns in the area of Lee and Char-
lotte Counties in southwest Florida. A total of 2,698 of the approximately 51,000 li-
censed pleasure boat owners8 were randomly sampled by mail and asked a series of
questions concerning their most recent boating trip to establish their boat-related ac-
tivities, area(s) of these activities, and their frequency of participation. Demographic
information — income, gender, and party size — were collected as well. Of the boat
owners surveyed, 197 surveys were returned as undeliverable and 1,175 usable sur-
veys were completed, for a 47% response rate. From this number, the sample was
7 This judgment is based on modeling of fishing using data from the same Lee County survey.
8 Boat registration data source: Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.A Random Utility Approach to Boating in Florida 27
further reduced to only those boaters who had made at least one trip within the past
12 months (n = 1,057), used a public boat ramp (i.e., trailered their boat, n = 409),
and were recreationally boating during their last trip (i.e., not exclusively fishing, n
= 209). Twenty-one additional surveys were removed from the sample for lacking
valid responses for key origin/destination questions, resulting in the final data set of
188 respondents for our trailer-dependent, recreational boating model.
Selected demographic and trip summary statistics for survey respondents are
listed in table 1. Of those respondents boating within the past 12 months, 38.7%
trailer their boats to public launches within the study area. Additionally, 51.2% of
those who trailer their boat consider themselves recreationally boating and not pri-
marily fishing.
 The survey revealed that recreational boaters in Lee County are predominately
male (90%+), Caucasian (90%+), and highly educated (more than half with a col-
lege degree).9 This demographic makeup may reflect the high capital investment re-
quired to engage in boating activities and the large amount of time available for rec-
reation (over one-third of the respondents are retired).
The nested MNL is estimated as a full-information maximum likelihood model
(FIML) and includes variables on site destination and demographic characteristics.
The model calculates probabilities of going to one of the site destinations in the
choice set, given that the boater has decided to make a trip. From equation 2, the
random utility function computes the probability that boater i will use boat launch j
to visit destination site k (see equation 3):
Pf T C X Z ijk ijk j k ,, ,, (, , ) . = (3)
The travel variable TCi,j,k is a function of the two distinct trip cost components; the
direct costs to operate the boat and automobile and the cost of time. The operating
costs for boats and automobiles can be divided into the drive from the boater’s ori-
gin to the boat launch-point, and the boat ride from the launch-point to the destina-
tion site. The highway distance in statute miles between the boater’s origin and all
potential launch sites within the two-county study area was calculated using com-
puter-mapping software.10 The boating distances between the launch site, destination
site, and all possible substitute destinations were calculated using nautical charts to
determine the shortest navigable distance in statute miles.
Driving costs are calculated by taking the calculated round-trip distance from
the boater’s home to the launch point and multiplying by the 1998 American Auto-
mobile Association (AAA) estimated variable cost per statute mile of $0.25. Vari-
able boating costs largely depend upon gas consumption, a function of boat length.
Table 2 lists the estimated costs per statue mile by boat size. Sailboats were assigned
a cost of $0.20 per mile. Per-mile boating costs are considered approximations and
compiled from several boating magazines, interviews with marinas, and other boat-
ing experts.
The cost of time is theoretically more difficult to resolve (Randall 1994;
Bockstael, Hanemann, and Strand 1987). Some previous studies have ignored it all
together. Other studies have arbitrarily assigned a fraction of the marginal wage rate
(Swanson, Thomas, and Donnelly 1989). McConnell (1992) assigned time as a pa-
rameter directly and avoided the marginal wage rate issue entirely. For this model,
the marginal wage rate will be assigned as the opportunity cost of time when it can
9 These results are similar to that of a statewide survey of boat launch users by Thomas and Stratis
(2001).
10 The mapping/distance software Hiways and Byways was used to calculate all land distances.Thomas and Stratis 28
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for General Boaters and All Boaters
Trip Characteristics General Boaters n = 188 All Boaters, n = 1,175
Category Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
Adult Party Size 2.89 0.600 2.78 0.110
Children in Party 0.53 0.007 0.37 0.003
Expend. ($ per person)
Travel (gas, etc.) 33.61 4.13 29.25 1.75
Food 36.08 8.92 29.22 4.32
Lodging 13.03 5.42 7.25 1.95
Other 7.97 2.78 18.96 4.67
Boater Demographics
General Boaters n = 188 All Boaters, n = 1,175
Category Percentage Percentage
Highest Level of Education
Some high school 2.1 4.6
High school graduate 10.1 13.7
Some college 22.3 25.5
College graduate 63.3 52.3
Other 2.2 3.9
Race/Ethnicity
African American/non Hispanic 0.0 0.5
Asian 0.0 0.2







Employed with flexible hours 5.9 6.1
Unemployed 0.0 0.2
Student 0.5 0.6





General Boaters n = 188 All Boaters, n = 1,175
Category Percentage Percentage
Boat Type





Jet ski 7.4 2.6
Other 1.1 10.2
Boat Length
14 feet or smaller 14.9 17.9
15 to 20 feet 44.7 39.8
21 to 25 feet 18.6 25.6
26 to 30 feet 8.5 9.4
31 feet or larger 13.3 7.3
mean = 21.06 mean = 19.10A Random Utility Approach to Boating in Florida 29
be clearly established that the individual could have actually earned this wage in
lieu of boating. For all other boaters, the value of time will be assigned either as an
approximate minimum wage rate ($5.00 per hour) after Tomasi and Thomas (1998)
or as one-third the average wage rate as a lower bound on the opportunity cost of
time. Because time spent boating is part of the recreational experience, only driving
time will be assigned a marginal cost.11
The explanatory variables are presented in table 3. Referring back to equations
1 through 3, the utility function derived from the jth launch point can be represented
as:
VI e jj j =+ τ , (4)
where
Ie j














The variable Ij represents the inclusive value, a measure of the expected utility
of a set of choice alternatives, in this case launch point choice alternatives. If the
inclusive value is equal to 1, the choice alternatives based on launch points add
nothing to our understanding of the decision process, and the independence of irrel-
evant alternatives (IIA) assumption holds. If the value falls within the zero to one
interval, the IIA assumption doesn’t hold (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985), and the
nesting structure adds useful information to the model.
Policymakers wish to determine the welfare change to boaters by imposing a
speed limit in 19 of the 37 possible destination sites. In order to capture the possibil-
ity that boaters would view the new speed limits as a “taking” of their status quo
opportunities, the policymakers wish to err on the conservative side by overstating
the potential welfare loss resulting from the new speed limits. The model accom-
plishes this goal by incorporating the assumption that boaters will regard destina-
tions in the newly zoned areas as unsuitable for recreational boating. This assump-
tion effectively closes the 19 destinations in these areas, and also makes the CV esti-
mate an upper bound to welfare loss. The measure of welfare loss follows the earlier
Table 2
Boating Cost by Boat Size Class










11 Phagan (1995) and Freeman (1993) discuss factors that may bias time cost estimates.Thomas and Stratis 30
work of Small and Rosen (1982) and Morey (1997). The post-policy welfare can





















ln ln , (6)
where Vprepolicy is the utility derived by boaters with all 37 sites available, before the
policy takes effect; Vpostpolicy is the utility derived from the subset of 18 sites follow-
ing the imposition of the speed limit; and β 1 is the parameter for travel cost that rep-
resents the marginal value of money.
Results
The model results are found in table 4. The cost variable, TC, includes the opportu-
nity cost of time, as well as the cost of travel, and carries the expected negative sign.
The presence of damaged sea grasses, major channels,12 rivers, and barrier islands
also appear to be characteristics that attract boaters. The presence of major channels
as an explanatory variable might be expected, since they allow boaters to travel at
higher speeds and follow direct paths to the site destination. Many of the destina-
tions identified by the survey respondents are in proximity to the Caloosahatchee
River, probably explaining the presence and significance of the ‘river’ variable. The
barrier islands variable probably appears for the same reason. The inclusive value of
.87 for the $5.00 wage rate suggests the nesting structure is helpful in describing the
choice. However, when the model uses one-third the wage rate, the inclusive value
approaches one.
Not surprisingly, the post-policy results generally indicate a redistribution of
trips away from areas near speed zones (Pine Island Sound and Estero Bay). Boating
effort is redirected to areas without zones (North Matlacha and San Carlos Bay).
Table 3
Explanatory Variable Names and Definitions
Variable Definition
TC Total variable cost of trip, including AAA rate of $0.25 per mile for driving
expenses, boat-size dependant rate per mile of boating (see table 2),
marginal wage rate for those boaters forgoing actual income opportunities
during the trip, and either a $5.00/hour or one-third the average wage rate
opportunity cost for all others.
DAMAGED Ordinal scale data representing proportion of a boating destination site with
damaged sea grass.
MAJOR Dummy variable for major channels (1 if major channel, 0 otherwise).
RIVER Dummy variable for river located in the boating destination site (1 if located
in river, 0 otherwise).
BARRIER Dummy variable for boating destination site being adjacent to a barrier
island (1 if adjacent to barrier island, 0 otherwise).
12 The proposed regulation allows for unregulated boat travel in all existing channels in zoned areas.A Random Utility Approach to Boating in Florida 31
Furthermore, travel cost, along with the presence of damaged sea grass, major chan-
nels, and proximity to barrier islands all significantly contribute to the probability of
selecting a boating destination.
For simplicity, the 37 destination sites are combined into 12 groups based upon
their location and policy management concerns. The visitation rates for these com-
bined sites are listed in table 5.
The distribution of actual visits to boating destinations is derived from the in-
formation provided by respondents in the boating survey. The model predicts a
launch point and boating site selection based upon model parameters. This process
is repeated both pre- and postpolicy to estimate the change in visitation resulting
from the policy. Since recreational boating is considered to be impractical at 5 mph,
the model assumes that zoned areas will not be used by boaters as destinations (al-
though boaters will in some cases pass through zoned areas on their way to unregu-
lated destinations), effectively reducing the number of destinations and launch
points available to boaters after the zones are posted. The model then calculates the
probabilities of going from a given launch point to a given destination in the pres-
ence of the zones, producing an estimate of the incidence of travel to and from par-
Table 4
Model Coefficients
Opportunity Cost of Time Opportunity Cost of Time
= $5.00 = $2.88
Variable Coefficient SE t Coefficient SE t
TC –0.14328 0.0223 –6.419 –0.14434 0.0224 –6.451
DAMAGED 0.52028 0.1892 2.751 0.51263 0.1894 2.707
MAJOR 0.86764 0.1879 4.619 0.88289 0.1877 4.704
RIVER 0.90320 0.2381 3.793 0.92102 0.2372 3.883
BARRIER 0.74758 0.1875 3.987 0.73663 0.1872 3.936
Inclusive Value 0.87209 0.1621 5.380 1.00031 0.1928 5.188
Table 5
Reported Visit Proportions and Predicted Probabilities
(1) (2) (3)
Actual Prepolicy Postpolicy
Combined Sites Visit Visit Prediction Visit Prediction
1. Pine Island Sound (a) 0.19 0.19 0.15
2. Pine Island Sound (b) 0.15 0.18 0.10
3. Pine Island Sound (c) 0.07 0.06 0.02
4. North Matlacha 0.02 0.03 0.05
5. South Matlacha 0.01 0.02 0.00
6. San Carlos Bay 0.09 0.12 0.21
7. Lower Caloosahatchee 0.05 0.05 0.09
8. Upper Caloosahatchee 0.16 0.13 0.23
9. Ft. Myers Beach 0.05 0.05 0.01
10. N. Estero Bay 0.05 0.06 0.01
11. S. Estero Bay 0.07 0.05 0.03
12. Gulf of Mexico 0.09 0.05 0.09Thomas and Stratis 32
ticular areas, both with and without the zones. The difference between the two pro-
vides an estimate of the degree to which recreational boating is disrupted by the
zones.
The model estimates the probability of selecting launch points and destinations,
before and after the imposition of the zones, using data from survey respondents
who identified themselves as general boaters. Using equation 6 and assuming a mar-
ginal wage rate of $5.00, a compensating variation of $8.03 for boaters is calculated
(for a marginal wage rate of $2.88, the compensating variation is $6.69). This figure
represents the minimum dollar amount per trip necessary to compensate a boater for
reducing the choices of boating areas from 37 to 19. It may also be interpreted as the
amount that a boater must receive to compensate for the quality change introduced
by the imposition of the speed zone. To calculate the total annual loss for the typical
boater, one must know the average number of trips taken annually by boaters. The
survey revealed boaters taking an average of 52.8 trips for 1996, producing an an-
nual estimate of $423.94 per boater to compensate for the loss in site quality
brought about by the new speed zones (or $353.23 for a marginal wage rate of
$2.88).
Summary and Conclusions
The model demonstrates some redistribution of recreational boating trips. The most
popular launch points in the absence of the zones (based on the results of the sur-
vey) are the Pine Island Sound locations, San Carlos Bay, the Upper Caloosahatchee
River, and the Gulf of Mexico. With zones in place, all three Pine Island Sound des-
tinations and North and South Estero Bays lose some share of total trips. North
Matlacha Pass, San Carlos Bay, and both upper and lower reaches of the
Caloosahatchee River gain shares. The model’s predicted relocation of sites and re-
distribution of boating effort is consistent with the proposed location of the speed
zones, and may be the result of costs imposed upon boaters.
However, one must not overlook the model’s built-in upward bias. The model
operates under the assumption that recreational boaters shun the 19 zoned destina-
tions entirely; in fact, it is likely that some recreational boaters will find the newly
zoned areas to be more attractive, and will continue to use them.
Returning to the broader issue of costs and benefits, the model’s revelation of
costs to boaters does not necessarily mean that the zones should not be put into
place, because the benefits of the rule may justify such a cost.
The model does, however, produce an estimate of those costs, and its results
provide regulatory officials in Florida with an indication of the costs to boaters of
the proposed rule.
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